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1 Introduction
Recently, the theory on international environmental agreements (IEA) and the prospect of
climate change have motivated many game theoretic studies, often focused on cooperation
and core solutions.
The necessity of cooperation among the countries involved, if a social optimum is to be
achieved, has already been addressed in the literature in terms of Game Theory concepts; see
e.g. Barrett (2003), Finus (2001) and references therein for a review on these topics. With
a few exceptions this literature works with simple static models of pollution despite the fact
that many of the important environmental problems, such as climate change, the depletion
of the ozone layer or the acid rain problem, are caused by a stock pollutant. However, the
stock of pollution may change in the course of the game, as a result of both a positive rate of
natural decay and emissions of the countries. Thus, the presence of a stock pollutant leads
to a dynamic game that is not strictly repeated.
In the framework of a deterministic cooperative game with a dynamic, multi-regional
integrated assessment model, Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) calculated the optimal path of
abatement and aggregated discounted welfare for each region by application of the transfer
scheme advocated in previous work by Chander and Tulkens (1997). They dened six regions
in the Climate Negotiation World Simulation Model (abbreviated as CWSM), a model which
was derived from the seminal multi-region economy-climate Regional Integrated model of Cli-
mate and the Economy (RICE) of Nordhaus and Yang (1996), they use of the idea of surplus
sharing allowed them to determine rst the transfer scheme and then to compute all possible
partial agreement Nash equilibria. It was found that allocation in the full cooperation lies
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in the core of the emission abatement game under this specic transfer scheme.
The transfer schemes are based on a single year for assigning the permits or shares in
the surplus. Such static schemes are also observed in reality, e.g. the reduction targets in
the Kyoto Protocol (1997) are designed in terms of reduction with respect to 1990 levels.
These static schemes, however, do not take into account that the future growth paths of
emissions are expected to diverge substantially between regions. Therefore historically large
emitters obtain relatively large shares of the permits/surplus, while fast-growing developing
countries, such as China or India, obtain relatively small shares. This leads to increasing
burdens on these developing countries to reduce their emissions; a notion brought forward by
many developing countries in their argumentation on why they do not agree on any reduction
targets in the Kyoto Protocol (1997).
The role of transfers in the analysis of self-enforcing International Environmental Agree-
ments (IEA) was developed in Carraro et al (2006). They proposed transfers using internal
and external nancial resources in order to make welfare optimal agreements. To illustrate
the relevance of their transfer scheme, they used a stylized integrated assessment simulation
model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may induce almost all countries
into signing a self-enforcing climate treat.
The studies by Germain et al (2003) addressed the issue of how many countries would
be interested in signing an IEA with stock pollutant, adopting a cooperative game-theory
approach. They extended the result established by Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997)
for ow pollutants to the larger context of closed-loop (feedback) dynamic games with a stock
pollutant. In this context, cooperation is negotiated at each period but nancial transfers
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provide incentives to the countries that ensure the implementation of the grand coalition at
each period. Their model thus yields a sequence of full cooperative international agreements
so that cooperation is also achieved in a dynamic setting with a stock pollutant.
Another paper related to this issue using a cooperative game-theory approach is Petrosjan
and Zaccour (2003). However, in this paper the authors assume that all countries decide to
cooperate at the initial time-consistent decomposition of each player's total cost, as given
by Shapley value, so that the countries stick at each moment to the full cooperative solution
agreed at initial time, supposing that the global allocation problem has been solved.
Stochastic Programming was considered by Dechert and O'Donnell (2006) in a particular
application that explored some fundamental issues of the optimal level of pollution in a lake
with competing uses. They showed how the model can be interpreted as an open loop
dynamic game, where the control variables are the levels of phosphorus discharged into the
watershed of the lake, the state of the system is the accumulated level of phosphorus in
the lake and the random shock (a multiplicative noise factor on the control variables of the
players) is the rainfall that washes the phosphorus in the lake.
The use of stochastic control models to develop climate-economy models was advocated
by Haurie and Viguier (2003) to represent the possible competition between Russia and China
on the international market of carbon emissions permits their model includes a representation
as an event tree of the uncertainty concerning the date of entry of developing countries on
this market. Also Bahn et al (2008) showed how a piecewise deterministic stochastic control
model, over an innite time horizon, could be used as a paradigm for the design of an ecient
climate policy. Keller et al (2004) had already explored the combined eects of uncertainty
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and learning about a climate threshold (an uncertain ocean thermohaline circulation collapse)
in an economic optimal growth model.
The stability of an International Environmental Agreement among n countries that emit
pollutant has been studied using dierential games, dened in continuous time, by Jorgensen
et al (2003) and (2004), Rubio and Casino (2005), among others.
As far as we know, the only stochastic formulation for the nite horizon dynamic analysis
of international agreements on transnational pollution control introduced as an extension of
the issues presented in Germain et al (2003) is a recent paper by Casas and Romera (2011).
In this paper, the stochastic formulation for the Stock Pollutant Control Model involves
the use of Stochastic Dynamic Programming with discrete and nite planing horizon, for
searching both cooperatives and non cooperatives equilibrium with transfers. Stochastic
optimization problems should be solved by Stochastic Dynamic Programming Techniques
(see Bertsekas (2000) and Birge and Louveaux (1997)).
The model proposed in this paper is directly linked to the Kyoto or post-Kyoto agreement
mechanisms. We use nancial transfers as additional elements in the game for the design of
international agreements that achieve global optimality in stock pollutant control problems.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the international stock pol-
lutant model with its components, the cost functional components and their elements; the
description of the modes of countries behaviour; the stock pollutant control models (co-
operative and non cooperative) and the underlaying Markov Decision Process (MDP). In
Section 3, we dene the monetary transfers to ensure that each country is not worse o
when it participates and we report on a non cooperative model with the monetary transfer
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corresponding to each country in each period of time, with the necessary denitions and
results. In Section 4, we present an algorithm which solves the problem of minimizing the
expected discounted total cost with transfers, the optimal action sets, and optimal policies
for a nite horizon model for each period of time and for every country. In Section 5, we
present a numerical example based on real scenarios borrowed from the work by Eyckmans
and Tulkens (2003) and Casas and Romera (2011). In Section 6, we present conclusions and
extensions.
2 The Stock Pollutant Control Model
In this section, we formulate a discrete-time stochastic dynamic game with nite planning
horizon. We refer to the reader to the modelization in Germain et al (2003) for a deterministic
counterpart of our setting. We consider a Markovian Game described by a tuple G =
fJ; T ; S; E; p; g, with the following elements; n players where J = f1; 2; :::; ng denotes the
set of countries (regions). A nite planing horizon with discrete-time periods t, such that
t 2 T = f1; 2; :::; Tg  Z+. The state space of the game, S, with elements s, is a Borel
subset of some Polish (i.e., complete, separable, metric) countable and non empty space.
The control variables or actions (emissions) are eit 2 E, where E is the countable and non
empty overall control space or action space, and E =
S
s2S E(s), where E(s) is the nite set
of admissible actions. The law of motion (or transition probabilities) p for the game dened
for each (s; e) 2 S  E is the conditional probability p(js; e) over the Borel sets of S.
The state of the system is the accumulated level of pollution in the atmosphere given as
6
stock of pollutant at each period t, st 2 S, which evolves according to the state equation
st = (1  )st 1 +
nX
i=1
eit + t ; 1  t  T; (1)
where s0 is the initial given stock of pollutant or preindustrial level and  is the pollutant's
natural rate of atmospheric absorption of CO2 between two periods of time, such that 0 <  <
1. The random disturbance t is a noise process: a sequence of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, and independent of the initial state s0, with
E [t] = 0; 2 = E

2t

<1; 8t = 1; 2; :::; T   1: (2)
Following Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) among many others, we assume that the emis-
sions are proportional to productions. The emissions are aggregated and considered as CO2
equivalents.
We consider that future costs are discounted by the constant and positive discount factor
 with 0 <   1. In addition, function ci(eit) measures in monetary terms the total cost
incurred by country i 2 J at period t 2 T from limiting its own industrial emissions to eit; it
is a dierentiable, decreasing (c0i < 0) and strictly convex function (c
00
i > 0). We assume that
the only way to control the stock of pollution is through the control of emissions, therefor
reducing pollution is done through the reduction of emissions, and not through the cleaning
of the environment. The marginal cost ci of reducing emissions is higher for lower levels of
emissions. Function di(st) measures in monetary terms the damages caused by the stock of
pollutant st during the time period t for the i-th country; it is a dierentiable, increasing
(d0i > 0) and convex function (d
00
i  0).
The damages in each country's environment depend on the emissions of pollutant of
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all dierent countries at each time-period t that contribute to a stock st. In cooperative
form the countries jointly choose at each period their emissions levels in order to minimize
the expected total discount costs, then the resulting trajectories of emissions and stock
constitute the international optimum. In non-cooperative form, each country considers only
the damages of the stock of pollutant over itself. In the sense of a Nash equilibrium, the
countries minimize, at each period, only its own expected discounted costs, with knowledge
of the emissions vector ejt, with j 6= i, of the other countries. Both the cooperative and non-
cooperative frameworks constitute the standard settings based on average costs optimality.
Although our approach is dierent to the former one, we develop some previous results for
further comparison to our proposed model.
2.1 The Cooperative Model
One assumes that the countries behave in an internationally optimal way, and the damages
to the environment of country i will depend on the emissions of all countries. We solve the
following problem
(P1) min
feitg
E
"
TX
t=1
nX
i=1
t (ci(eit) + di(st))
#
s.t. st = (1  )tst 1 +
nX
i=1
eit + t
eit  0 8t 2 T ; 8i 2 J
s0 > 0
The convexity of the functions ci(eit) and di(st) suces to guarantee that the solution exists
and is unique (see Casas and Romera (2011)). Thus, Problem (P1) has an equilibrium
feWit g. Note that the resulting family of trajectories of emissions (policies) eWit for all players
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i 2 J with the resulting stock sWt , constitute the international optimum or the cooperative
equilibrium for all periods t 2 T . By following basic principals of Dynamic Programming (see
Puterman (2005)) we obtain the value function W (t; st), 8t 2 T . Let denote by Wi(t; sWt ),
for all t 2 T , the contribution of the country i to the expected discounted total cost evaluated
at the international optimum sWt . Let Wi be the marginal expected discounted cooperative
total cost for all country i 2 J , then
Wi 
TX
t=1
Wi(t; s
W
t 1): (3)
Note that this marginal value is the overall cost incurred by country i under the cooperative
paradigm.
2.2 The Non-Cooperative Model
In this mode of behaviour, one may assume that countries behave non cooperatively in
the sense of Nash equilibrium, where each of them minimizes at each period only its own
discounted costs, taking into account the emissions of the other countries. In such an equi-
librium, no individual country has an incentive to deviate as long as the other countries stick
to their equilibrium strategies. Formally, there are n (P2) problems to solve one for each
country i 2 J
(P2) min
feitg
E
"
TX
t=1
t [ci(eit) + di(st)]
#
s.t. st = (1  )st 1 +
nX
i=1
eit + t
eit  0 8t 2 T ; 8i 2 J
s0 > 0
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According to Bellman's principle and using Stochastic Dynamic Programming, see Put-
erman (2005) and Hernandez-Lerma (1999), we obtain the optimal expected value function,
Ni(t; st), for all t 2 T and for each country i 2 J .
Note that the resulting vector of trajectories of emissions eNit , for all country i 2 J ,
together with the resulting stock sNt , constitute a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for all
periods t 2 T . The convexity of the function ci(eit) and di(st) suces to guarantee that the
Nash equilibrium exists and is unique, see Casas and Romera (2011).
Let dene Ni for each country i 2 J and for all t 2 T , as the expected discounted non
cooperative total cost by
Ni 
TX
t=1
Ni(t; s
N
t 1): (4)
Algorithms for solving problems (P1) and (P2) can be found in Casas and Romera (2011)
with their corresponding numerical results.
2.3 The underlying MDP Model
The models considered up here in this work are discrete-time, nite-horizon and stationary
MDP, described by the tuple
  = (S;E;R; P; ); (5)
where the state space S and the overall action space E =
S
s2S E(s) are both countable
and nonempty, E(s) is the set of admissible actions (emissions), when the system is in each
state (pollutant level) s. For each s 2 S the set E(s) is nite. The cost set R is a bounded
countable subset of R. For each t  1, let st, et and rit, with rit = ci(eit) + di(st), denote
the state (pollutant level) of the system, the action (emissions) taken by the decision maker
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i (pays), and the cost incurred at period of time t, respectively.
The stationary, single-stage, conditional transition probabilities are dened by
pei;j;r := Prob (st+1 = j; rt = r=st = i; et = e) ; (6)
8i; j 2 S; e 2 E(i); r 2 R; t  1;
X
j2S;r2R
pei;j;r = 1; i 2 S; e 2 E(i):
The parameter  with 0 <   1, is the constant and positive discount factor.
3 The Transfers Denition
At the international optimum (P1), and contrary to what happens at the Nash equilibrium
(P2) in Casas and Romera (2011), each country takes account of the impact of its pollution
on the environment of all other countries. Therefore, from a collective point of view, the
optimum is better than the Nash equilibrium. Nothing ensures that this is also true at
the individual level. Indeed, countries being dierent, it is possible that some country i at
some period of time t is better o at the non cooperative equilibrium than the optimum, so
that cooperation is not protable for this country, at least at time t. The same can occur
for subsets of countries (i.e. coalitions) in the sense that, by limiting cooperation to such
coalitions, the members of the latter could be better o than at the international optimum.
In a deterministic dynamic programming framework, Germain et al (2003) propose a
mechanism of nancial transfers between countries that can make them interested in achiev-
ing the international optimum at all periods t (individual rationality). This mechanism has
the additional property that no subgroup of countries has ever an incentive to form a coali-
tion and enact an optimum for itself only (coalition rationality). In the present paper, our
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aim is to apply this mechanism to the climate change stochastic model introduced by Casas
and Romera (2011).
At each time period t one could take the non cooperative Nash equilibrium from t onwards
as such point of reference, and determine the transfers accordingly. However, one should
not neglect the fact that countries know that later on, thanks to the cooperative transfers
to which they will have access, they will be better o than at the non cooperative Nash
equilibrium. Hence, a better point of reference at period of time t is non cooperation at time
t, followed by cooperation afterwards. We are thus aiming at a cooperative international
optimum.
3.1 The Transfers at nal period T
We start by determining which transfers yield for all countries when they cooperate in the
last period t = T , of the nite horizon T , for any level of the stock of pollution sT 1 inherited
from the past.
In the non cooperative equilibrium the countries are supposed to solve problem (P2), the
country i's expected total cost at period nal T is then
Ni(T; s
N
T 1) = ci(e
N
iT ) + di(s
N
T );
where eNiT = (e
N
1T ; e
N
2T ; : : : ; e
N
nT ) denotes the vector of emissions equilibrium level of each
countries and sNT denotes the resulting stock of pollutant given by
sNT = [1  ]sNT 1 +
nX
i=1
eNiT ;
where sNT 1 is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period T .
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If countries cooperate, they jointly solve (P1). The country i's expected total cost at
nal period T is
Wi(T; s
W
T ) = ci(e
W
iT ) + di(s
W
T );
where eWiT = (e
W
1T ; e
W
2T ; : : : ; e
W
nT ) is the vector of optimal emission level (policy) and s
W
T is the
optimal stock of pollutant at nal period T , given by
sWT = [1  ]sT 1 +
nX
i=1
eWiT ;
where s is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period T .
Let denes W (T; sWT ) and N(T; s
N
T ) as the expected total cost cooperative and non co-
operative, respectively, at nal period of time T . By denition of the optimum, one veries
that
W (T; s) 
nX
i=1
Wi(T; s) 
nX
i=1
Ni(T; s)  N(T; s): (7)
The dierence W (T; s) N(T; s), between the two sides of this inequality (7) measures
the ecological surplus resulting from international cooperation.
However, the inequality (7) is not sucient to ensure cooperation. Indeed, if 9i 2 J
such that Wi(T; s) > Ni(T; s), then country i will not cooperate without nancial compen-
sation for higher cost it incurs. Since stochastic dynamic programming reduces the choice of
emissions to one period at the time, one can use the transfers formula in a static framework.
Following the transfers formula proposed by Chander and Tulkens (1997) in a static
framework, we can use this transfers formula in our stochastic dynamic framework at nal
period T
i(T; s) =  [Wi(T; s) Ni(T; s)] + iT [W (T; s) N(T; s)]; (8)
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with
nX
i=1
i(T; s) = 0:
The transfer (8) is < 0 if received and > 0 if paid to country i at period T , and it satises
that iT 2]0; 1[, 8i 2 J , and
nX
i=1
iT = 1:
The fact that iT cannot be equal to 0 ensure that country i will benet from cooperation
if Wi(T; s) < Ni(T; s). The fact that iT cannot be equal to 1 exclude that country i
monopolizes all the gains of cooperation.
Then country i's total cost including transfers at nal period T becomes
~Wi(T; s) = Wi(T; s) + i(T; s): (9)
The cooperation with transfers is individually rational at nal period of time T , in the
sense that each country have interest to participate whatever the inherited stock of pollutant
s, since by construction
~Wi(T; s) Ni(T; s) = i;T [W (T; s) N(T; s)]  0; 8i 2 J:
3.2 The Transfers at period T   1
The countries know that, whatever they do at period T   1, nancial transfers exist dened
by (8), that make the international optimum (cooperative) at period T preferable for each
of them with respect to the non cooperative equilibrium. Lets assume that these transfers
induce cooperation, following Chander and Tulkens (1997), one could indeed obtain the
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cooperative optimum with transfers as an equilibrium, called ratio equilibrium, and that
countries therefore expect, at period of time T   1, that they will cooperate in period T .
This is the rational expectations assumption. The problem we wish to consider now is
whether under assumption transfers can be designed that make the countries interested to
cooperate at period T   1 as well.
In absence of cooperation at T   1, each country i 2 J minimizes its own expected
discounted total cost over two periods T   1 and T , expecting cooperation and transfers at
period T . Thus, given the emissions of the other countries, the country i solves problem
(P2) for t = T   1 with expected transfers at period T .
There are n problems to solve at period T   1, each country i 2 J solves the following
problem
min
ei;T 1
E
h
ci(ei;T 1) + di(sT 1) +  ~Wi(T; sT 1)
i
(10)
s.t. sT 1 = (1  )sT 2 +
nX
i=1
ei;T 1 + T 1
ei;T 1  0; 8i 2 J:
Since the expected value functions ~Wi(T; sT 1) contain transfers that sum up to zero,
convexity of the cost functions ci and damages function di ensure that the objectives in (10)
are convex, unlike what happens for the period T .
This yields an equilibrium characterized at period T   1 by emissions level eVi;T 1 as
functions of initial stock s at period T  1. The expected value functions Vi(T  1; s) denotes
country i's expected discounted non cooperative equilibrium costs including future transfers
at nal period T .
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The expected value functions Vi, according to Bellman's principle of optimality
Vi(T   1; s) = ci(eVi;T 1) + di(sVT 1) +  ~Wi(T; sVT 1); 8i 2 J; (11)
where
sVT 1 = (1  )sT 2 +
nX
i=1
eVi;T 1;
denotes country i's expected discounted equilibrium costs. We will call this equilibrium the
non cooperative equilibrium with transfers at period T   1.
In the case where all countries cooperate, they solve problem (P1) for t = T  1. Optimal
levels of emissions and of the resulting stock of pollutant are denoted by eWi;T 1 and s
W
T 1,
respectively, both are function of the initial stock s at period T   1. This yields
Wi(T   1; s) = ci(eWi;T 1) + di(sWT 1) +  ~Wi(T; sWT 1); 8i 2 J; (12)
which is country i's part in the optimal expected total discounted costs, taking into account
the transfers and the resulting cooperation expected at nal period T .
As in period T , see (7), one veries that
W (T   1; s) 
nX
i=1
Wi(T   1; s) 
nX
i=1
Vi(T   1; s)  V (T   1; s): (13)
The dierence W (T   1; S)   V (T   1; s), between the two sides of this inequality (13)
measures the ecological surplus induced by extending from international cooperation to period
T   1, with respect to alternative scenario where cooperation is limited to period T .
However, (13) is again not sucient to induce cooperation at time T   1, if exist i 2 J
such that Wi(T   1; S) > Vi(T   1; s), then country i will not want to extend cooperation
to period T   1 without nancial compensation.
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To induce country i to participate at period T   1, let
i(T   1; s) =  [Wi(T   1; s)  Vi(T   1; s)] + i;T 1[W (T   1; s)  V (T   1; s)]; (14)
be the transfer paid or received by country i at period T   1 where i;T 1 2]0; 1[, for all
i 2 J and
nX
i=1
i;T 1 = 1 and
nX
i=1
i(T   1; s) = 0:
Then country i's expected total cost including transfers becomes
~Wi(T   1; s) = Wi(T   1; s) + i(T   1; s):
It is clear that this transfers dened by (14) make cooperation individually rational at
period T   1, whatever the inherited stock of pollutant s.
3.3 The Transfers at period t
We can repeat the preceding analysis for all earlier periods. The nal result will be that the
countries cooperate in each period t. This determines the emissions levels in each period for
each country, and also the trajectory of the stock of pollutant, given its initial value s0. In
turn these trajectory determines the expected value functions Vi, Wi and ~Wi, and therefore
also the value of the transfers i.
There are n problems to solve, one for each country i, named (P3)
(P3) min
eit
E
h
(ci(eit) + di(st)) +  ~Wi(t+ 1; st)
i
s.t. st = (1  )st 1 +
nX
i=1
eit + t
eit  0 8t 2 T ; 8i 2 J
s0 > 0
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This yields an equilibrium characterized at period t by emissions level eVit as functions of
initial stock s0 at each period t.
The value functions Vi(t; s) denotes the country i's expected discounted non cooperative
equilibrium costs including transfers at t+ 1 period
Vi(t; st) = ci(e
V
it) + di(st) +  ~Wi(t+ 1; st); 8i 2 J;
where the transfer paid or received by country i at period t
i(t; s) =  [Wi(t; s)  Vi(t; s)] + i;t
"
nX
i=1
Wi(t; s) 
nX
i=1
Vi(t; s)
#
: (15)
be the transfer paid or received by country i at period t where i;t 2]0; 1[, for all i 2 J ,
nX
i=1
i;t = 1 and
nX
i=1
i(t; s) = 0:
Then country i's expected total cost including transfers becomes
~Wi(t; s) =Wi(t; s) + i(t; s):
It is clear that these transfers (15) make cooperation individually rational at period t,
whatever the inherited stock of pollutant s.
3.4 The Problem with transfers Alternative
Following Casas and Romera (2011), and bearing in mind the explicit recursive expression
(1) obtained for the stock pollutant st, we have to solve for each country i 2 J the alternative
problem with future transfers, as following
min
feitg
E
hh
ci(eit) + ~di(s0; eit; t)
i
+  ~Wi(t+ 1; st)
i
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s.t. Mieit = bi + 
eit  0 8t 2 T ; 8i 2 J
s0 > 0
where
e0i = (ei1; ei2;    ; ei;T 1)
b0i = (bi1; bi2;    ; bi;T 1)
bit =  (1  )ts0  
tX
=1
nX
j 6=i
(1  )t ej
0 =
 
1; (1  )1 + 2; : : : ; : : : ; (1  )T 11 + (1  )T 22 +   + T

The matrixMi is a square matrix, lower triangular, of order T , with ones in the principal
diagonal. The vector b and the random disturbance  have order T . The structure of the
matrix Mi is as follows
Mi =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0    0
(1  ) 1 0 0 0    0
(1  )2 (1  ) 1 0 0    0
(1  )3 (1  )2 (1  ) 1 0    0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
(1  )t 1 (1  )t 2 (1  )t 3       (1  ) 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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then we can may obtain the inverse matrix of the matrix Bi, which is quasi diagonal
M 1i =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0    0
 (1  ) 1 0 0 0    0
0  (1  ) 1 0 0    0
0 0  (1  ) 1 0    0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
0 0 0        (1  ) 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
As in the cooperative model solution (P1) and in the non cooperative model solution
(P2), by using the development presented in this section one can nd the parameters eVit of
optimal emissions for each country i 2 J , and one obtains the stock levels of contamination
sVt at each period of time t 2 T .
3.5 The innite horizon case
In the innite horizon case (T = 1), the backward reasoning considered above no longer
applies. However, we can consider the stationary solution by taking advantage of the fact
that the cost functions ci and di as well as the sharing parameters i do not depend directly
on time. The functional forms of the solutions thus only vary in time through the varying
stock of pollutant s.
In both the cooperative (P1) and non cooperative (P2) problems, identical steps are
repeated over all time periods. The solution functions of these problems are now constant,
and only the value of the stock s must be calculated at each poriod of time.
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In the case where T =1, the expected discounted total cost of the cooperative problem
(P1) does not depend explicitly of time, and its value function W can be written as
W (s) = min
ei
E
"
nX
i=1
ci(ei) + di(s) + W (s)
#
s.t. s = (1  )s+
nX
i=1
ei + 
ei  0 8i 2 J
The First Order Conditions of Bellman equations lead to the optimal emission levels e
and stock s, both depending on s, which solve the system
c0i(e

i ) +
nX
j=1
d0j(s
) + W 0(s) = 0 8i 2 J (16)
s = [1  ]s+
nX
i=1
ei +  (17)
W (s) =
nX
i=1
ci(e

i ) + di(s
) + W (s) (18)
where c0i and d
0
j are the derivatives of the functions ci and dj respectively. Optimal values of
emissions ei and stock pollution s
 are obtained by solving these equations.
The main problem is the identication of a value function W such that First Order
Conditions (16), (17) and (18) are met. This system can be considered as a functional
equations system, where functions W , s and ei are unknown for all i 2 J . This system can
be solved whenever functions ci and dj are know for all i 2 J .
The same reasoning can be applied to the country cost functions Vi and Wi. Total cost
of country i with no present cooperation can be obtained in the case of innite horizon, in
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analogy with (8), (9) and (P3), assuming the country will cooperate in the future
Vi(s) = min
ei
E [(ci(ei) + di(s)) +  [Vi(s) + i[W (s)  V (s)]]]
s.t. sV = (1  )s+
nX
i=1
eVi +  sgiven
ei  0 8i 2 J
ej withj 6= i given
In the non-cooperative equilibrium with transfers problem, emission levels eVi and stock
sV can be obtained in terms of stock s by solving the First Order equations
c0i(e
V
i ) + d
0
j(s
V ) + 

V 0i (s
V ) + i[W
0(sV )  V 0(sV )] = 0 8i 2 J (19)
sV = [1  ]s+
nX
i=1
eVi +  (20)
Vi(s) = ci(e
V
i ) + di(s
V ) + 

Vi(s
V ) + i[W (s
V )  V (sV )] 8i 2 J (21)
where c0i and d
0
j are the derivatives of the functions ci and dj respectively.
As in the previous case, the problem now is again the identication of the value functions
Vi such that First Order Conditions (19), (20) and (21) are met. Let V be V =
Pn
i=1 Vi
and recall that W has been calculated in problem (P1). First Order Conditions can then be
considered as a functional equations system where functions Vi, V , s
V and eVi are unknown
for all i 2 J . This system can be solved whenever functions ci and dj are known for all i 2 J .
If
Wi(s) = ci(e
V
i ) + di(s
) +  ~Wi(s)  Vi(sV ) (22)
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holds for each i 2 J then every country will be interested in cooperate. This means that the
cost corresponding to each country i under cooperation improves the cost without coopera-
tion. This can be considered as a signal of individual rationality.
On the other hand, if (22) does not hold, transfer functions are dened:
i(s) =  [Wi(s)  Vi(s)] + i [W (s)  V (s)]
where i 2]0; 1[, for all i 2 J and
Pn
i=1 i = 0. My construction of these functionsPn
i=1 i(s) = 0. Furthermore, if country i receives i(s) under cooperation, then
~Wi(s) = Wi(s) + i(s) = Vi(s) + i[W (s)  V (s)]  Vi(s) (23)
This can be taken as a proof that individual rationality is still under cooperation for
every value of the inherited stock of pollutant s.
4 The Algorithm
The aim of this section is to describe a numerical algorithm that calculates the expected value
and the transfers functions when the cost functions ci and di are convex. The algorithm is
written for nite horizon problems, which is appropriate for most practical applications.
The emissions and stock trajectories associated with the international cooperative optimum
(P1) can be calculated by non linear stochastic programming techniques. The transfers are
more dicult to calculate, because they make use of values calculated at non cooperative
equilibrium (P2), so that one must proceed by backward induction. The basic idea is to
construct explicit approximations for the surfaces or value functions ~Wi(t; st 1), for all i 2 J ,
as polynomial functions of st 1, by using classical regression.
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The rst step of the algorithm is to solve the cooperative problem (P1) associated with the
international optimum. This is done by using non linear stochastic programming techniques
and leads to the optimal trajectories of the abatement rates eWit for all i 2 J and t 2 T and
of the CO2 stock s
W
t with t 2 T .
The second step computes the nancial transfers. This solves the stochastic dynamic
programming problems associated with the non cooperative equilibrium. As the algorithm
proceeds backwards, this is rst done at the nal time T using the system of rst order
conditions associated to the non-cooperative problem (P2).
Hence one obtains the non cooperative abatement rates eNjT , the transfers i(s; T ) and
the expected discounted total costs (transfers included) ~Wi(T; s) for all t 2 T as functions
of the CO2 stock sT inherited at the beginning of time T .
The resolution for period T of problems (P2) is repeated for a set ST of given values of
the inherited CO2 stock. This set is chosen in order to be representative of the interval of
possible values of sT . Once the values ~Wi(T; s) for all i 2 J have been calculated on the set
ST , the value functions ~WiT are written as polynomials of sT and regressed on the set ST .
So that the functions ~WiT are approximated by explicit analytical functions of sT .
The step 2 of the algorithm is repeated for each period of time T   1, T   2, ... until
period 1. At each period, one calculates the non cooperative equilibrium by solving the
system of rst order conditions associated to problems with monetary transfers (P3). To do
so at time t, the algorithm makes use of the polynomials regressed for period of time t+ 1.
Once the value functions ~Wit are known as functions of st for all times of the planning
period t 2 T , the algorithm performs its third step, i.e. the computation of the actual values
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of these value functions and of the transfers for all regions all along the optimal trajectory
eW1 ; e
W
2 ; :::; e
W
T calculated at rst step.
4.1 The Statement of the Algorithm
The algorithm consists of several steps
Step 1
The algorithm solves the stochastic optimization cooperative problem (P1) associated
with the international optimum. The rst order conditions are
c0i(e
W
it ) +
TX
=t
 t[1  ] t
nX
j=1
d0j(s
W
 ) = 0 8i 2 J ;8t 2 T (24)
sWt = [1  ]s+
nX
i=1
eWit 8t 2 T (25)
where c0i and d
0
j are the derivatives of functions ci and dj respectively. Solving these T (n+1)
equations yields to the optimal values of emissions eWit and the stock of pollutant s
W
t for all
periods of time t 2 T .
Step 2a
To calculate the transfers, one must rst solve the stochastic dynamic programming prob-
lems associated with the non cooperative equilibrium. The algorithm proceeds backwards,
starting from the last period. At nal time T , given the inherited stock of pollutant s, the
non cooperative equilibrium, which coincides with the Nash equilibrium at last period, has
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to satisfy the conditions
c0i(e
N
iT ) + d
0
i
 
[1  ]s+
nX
j=1
eNjT
!
= 0 8i 2 J (26)
Once this system of equations has been solved for the variables eNjT , and knowing by Step
1 the optimal emissions at time T , it is possible to calculate the transfers i(s; T ) using
~i(s) =  [ci(eWi )  ci(eVi )] + ~i(sW )
nX
j=1
[cj(e
W
j )  cj(eVj )] (27)
with
~i(s
W
T ) =
d0i(s
W
T )Pn
j=1 d
0
j(s
W
T )
(28)
as well as the value functions ~Wi(T; S) dened by
~Wi(s) =Wi(s) + ~i(s); 8i 2 J: (29)
The Step 2a is done for a set 
T of given values of the inherited stock of pollutant s.
This set is chosen to be representative of the interval of possible values of s. This interval is
bounded below by the value of s that would be obtained with zero emissions during periods
1; 2; : : : ; T   1 given s0, and bounded above by the value of s that would be obtained with
maximum emissions during the same period of time.
Step 2b
We now assume that the total costs with transfers at time T have the following polynomial
form
~Wi(T; s) = kiT;ms
m + kiT;m 1sm 1 + :::+ kiT;0 8i 2 J
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where m is the order of the polynomial chosen so that the t is good enough. To identify
the parameters kiT;m; kiT;m 1; :::; kiT;0, we use an ordinary least square regression method
implemented in the software Matlab, so that the functions ~Wi(T; s) are now approximated
by explicit analytical functions of s.
The Steps 2a and 2b are then repeated for period T   1. Given (10) and the inherited
stock of pollution s, the rst order conditions associated to the non cooperative equilibrium
are
c0i(e
V
it ) + d
0
i
0@[1  ]s+ nX
j=1
eVj;T 1
1A+  ~W 0i
0@24[1  ]s+ nX
j=1
eVj;T 1
35 ; T
1A = 0 (30)
for all i 2 J .
Once this system of equations has been solved for the eVj;T 1, it is possible to calculate
the transfers i(s; T   1) using (27)-(28) and the value functions ~Wi(s; T   1) using (29).
This is done for a set 
T 1 of given values of the inherited stock of pollutant s, so that
by regression of the calculated values ~Wi(s; T   1) on 
T 1, they can be approximated by
explicit analytical functions of s.
The algorithm continues backwards by repeating Steps 2a and 2b until the rst time
period t = 1 is reached.
Step 3
Once the value functions ~Wi are known as functions of S for all periods of time of the
planning period T = f1; 2; :::; Tg, the algorithm calculates the actual values of both these
value functions and the transfers for all countries all along the optimal trajectory calculated
at Step 1.
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5 A numerical Example
In this section, we show some numerical results obtained from solving the problem (P3)
in a real scenario. The simulations are made for a time horizon of 100 years, but we give
the results only up to 2030, in order to avoid boundary problems. All computations were
made by use of the software Matlab 7.3.0 (R2006b). We have implemented the equivalent
formulation of problem (P3) given in Section 3. Thus, we have developed specic code for
our example.
The cost and damage functions used in this case are nonlinear and the arguments of
these functions are selected according to climate and economic principles. The temperature
change equation is taken from the climate economy model RICE (Regional Integrated model
of Climate and the Economy), as well as most of the parameter values and all basic data
on GDP, population, capital stock, carbon emissions and concentration and global mean
temperature. A complete overview of the equations and parameter values of the Climate
Negotiation (CLIMNEG) World Simulation Model (abbreviated as CWSM) can be found in
Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) and Casas and Romera (2011). The partition of the world is
the same as in the RICE model. There are 6 countries or regions: USA, Japan, European
Union (EU), China, Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Rest of the World (ROW). The time
is divided in years and the initial period (period t = 0) refers to year 1990.
Let consider optimal cooperative W and non cooperative N value functions respectively
of Casas and Romera (2011), for each country and for each period of time. We conclude
that countries like USA or ROW have not incentive to cooperate, and the other hand Japan
has from the beginning interest in cooperation. Thus, without any modication of the initial
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game the most rational behavior of countries will probably be the non cooperation one, and
the Nash equilibrium will result in the optimal non-cooperative stock pollutant fsNt g. It
means that the stock pollutant will be international optimum fsWt g.
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Figure 1: Financial transfers it of country i for each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA
dollars.
Table (1) and Figure (1) show the prole of nancial transfers it received and given for
each country i 2 J and each period of time t 2 T . A negative transfer is a transfer received,
and a positive transfer is a transfer given by the country i at period t. Note that ROW, EU
and USA pay at each period a transfer to China, Japan and FSU in order to induce these
regions to cooperate.
Table (2) shows the optimal cooperative value function ~Wit with transfers it of country
i for each period of time t. Let compare these results with the optimal cooperative value
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function Wit and Nit in Casas and Romera (2011). As it is expected the total value function
is the same because the total sum of the transfers is equal to zero. Let compare the marginal
total value function of country under both cooperative models summarized in these tables.
We observe that USA, EU and ROW increase these values when transfers are considered in
comparison to the basic cooperative game, while Japan, China and FSU are net receivers of
transfers.
Table (3) resumes all the results related to the marginal optimal value function per
country under the cooperative, non cooperative and cooperative with transfers games. Note
that the distribution of the total value function in the model with transfers, the last column
in Table (3), provides net given countries like USA, EU and ROW. This is necessary in
order to achieve the international optimum fsWt g which is the same as in the cooperative
model (P1) of Casas and Romera (2011). This is in fact a weakness of this proposal, the
cooperative model with transfers (P3). A question arises, Are there enough incentives in
order to ensure that these countries will be able to accept that solution?
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Table 1: Transfers received or given it per country i for each period of time t in billions of
1990 USA dollars.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
1 1,344 9,448 1,950 6,337 6,438 -25,518 0
2 4,502 9,972 8,562 8,561 8,582 -40,179 0
3 3,897 10,566 7,657 7,252 7,199 -36,570 0
4 3,136 9,226 8,295 3,207 3,422 -27,286 0
5 3,280 7,255 12,482 -0,970 -0,847 -21,200 0
6 4,370 3,886 17,805 -8,220 -7,681 -10,160 0
7 11,772 6,548 28,113 -10,999 -10,233 -25,201 0
8 5,460 -3,537 25,595 -28,118 -28,005 28,605 0
9 18,018 -1,396 45,842 -33,272 -33,347 4,155 0
10 29,970 -0,824 62,288 -43,405 -44,534 -3,495 0
11 32,436 -12,435 72,837 -68,624 -69,029 44,814 0
12 38,045 -19,538 89,594 -90,332 -91,572 73,802 0
13 52,374 -27,270 114,094 -115,961 -117,777 94,539 0
14 64,968 -37,387 137,561 -143,903 -147,685 126,446 0
15 74,123 -55,283 162,851 -182,176 -187,505 187,990 0
16 84,494 -74,426 182,412 -227,146 -232,343 267,010 0
17 101,462 -88,426 215,900 -263,159 -274,450 308,674 0
18 101,608 -123,503 226,931 -322,520 -337,154 454,638 0
19 127,461 -136,978 271,382 -365,000 -382,995 486,131 0
20 113,754 -186,970 270,760 -439,026 -464,389 705,871 0
21 127,734 -214,839 296,716 -491,414 -521,973 803,776 0
22 138,693 -244,477 326,143 -552,522 -589,603 921,766 0
23 154,696 -279,573 349,452 -611,008 -655,119 1041,551 0
24 171,396 -319,129 373,623 -674,143 -723,614 1171,865 0
25 187,499 -351,904 401,119 -736,773 -793,565 1293,623 0
26 194,499 -391,849 418,039 -804,2897 -866,545 1450,145 0
27 196,856 -431,922 431,069 -862,506 -942,539 1609,042 0
28 211,961 -481,956 451,534 -931,934 -1020,664 1771,060 0
29 207,796 -524,782 458,192 -997,308 -1099,344 1955,446 0
30 214,195 -575,060 454,540 -1060,708 -1174,514 2141,547 0
31 228,066 -612,957 467,591 -1115,824 -1242,638 2275,761 0
32 237,386 -662,788 478,792 -1170,096 -1311,934 2428,640 0
33 224,590 -716,412 476,237 -1235,415 -1391,554 2642,554 0
34 225,200 -759,759 465,807 -1290,270 -1465,844 2824,866 0
35 228,321 -809,238 456,043 -1342,846 -1536,995 3004,715 0
36 215,579 -866,480 448,571 -1395,338 -1599,790 3197,458 0
37 212,161 -927,964 419,422 -1454,819 -1676,990 3428,191 0
38 194,319 -973,168 401,847 -1492,729 -1730,234 3599,965 0
39 221,677 -984,480 418,007 -1496,011 -1757,176 3597,984 0
40 201,541 -1052,285 378,299 -1558,071 -1833,559 3864,077 0
Total 4870,641 -12892,096 10333,951 -23591,495 -26338,098 47617,097 0
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Table 2: Optimal Cooperative Value Function ~Wit with transfers it per country i for each
period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
1 11,713 12,493 13,424 7,128 7,260 14,587 66.607
2 28,207 19,968 34,779 10,677 11,149 40,399 145.178
3 50,170 33,001 63,877 11,363 12,306 78,134 248.851
4 78,112 48,018 101,561 10,428 11,903 128,446 378.469
5 113,754 63,781 149,067 10,096 11,943 193,851 542.492
6 154,415 81,375 203,179 7,314 9,726 271,426 727.435
7 205,217 107,883 269,183 9,623 12,303 367,301 971.510
8 248,125 121,759 327,812 -1,806 0,048 462,235 1158.172
9 307,766 149,995 404,808 -0,990 0,507 580,153 1442.238
10 367,301 174,926 481,586 -5,076 -4,924 706,112 1719.925
11 417,462 187,171 549,274 -23,807 -24,051 830,075 1936.124
12 470,951 202,598 620,323 -39,558 -41,182 966,771 2179.902
13 527,332 215,311 694,166 -58,167 -62,694 1109,769 2425.717
14 577,722 223,345 760,871 -80,148 -88,469 1252,451 2645.772
15 619,311 222,145 821,521 -112,676 -124,533 1396,334 2822.102
16 658,402 215,144 874,042 -152,595 -166,349 1542,044 2970.687
17 703,078 210,715 934,467 -184,326 -204,952 1695,016 3153.998
18 724,793 183,688 965,247 -238,731 -266,190 1834,475 3203.282
19 764,166 174,115 1019,765 -277,295 -310,298 1993,415 3363.869
20 760,703 129,847 1028,551 -348,459 -389,777 2120,401 3301.268
21 784,681 100,961 1058,533 -397,593 -447,326 2266,549 3365.805
22 798,736 69,107 1085,503 -456,175 -514,123 2418,482 3401.530
23 808,947 31,018 1100,829 -512,848 -581,356 2560,294 3406.884
24 817,373 -13,358 1113,577 -575,314 -651,136 2709,680 3400.821
25 821,474 -54,283 1122,285 -637,198 -722,511 2850,642 3380.409
26 818,029 -103,617 1118,464 -702,792 -797,140 2990,516 3323.459
27 801,938 -154,773 1108,514 -763,070 -875,387 3124,254 3241.477
28 793,182 -218,269 1090,459 -835,192 -955,750 3251,602 3126.033
29 767,898 -273,973 1076,702 -901,501 -1037,413 3376,618 3008.332
30 754,921 -333,611 1051,298 -965,577 -1114,717 3497,996 2890.311
31 742,584 -385,926 1031,607 -1022,805 -1186,220 3627,795 2807.036
32 720,020 -445,725 1007,040 -1081,844 -1258,747 3751,389 2692.133
33 686,851 -514,676 968,473 -1149,871 -1339,950 3859,373 2510.199
34 664,655 -571,019 939,731 -1206,772 -1417,620 3977,051 2386.026
35 632,763 -631,237 896,446 -1265,289 -1490,979 4097,682 2239.386
36 604,897 -695,347 864,043 -1318,900 -1557,640 4208,091 2105.144
37 575,247 -756,824 812,375 -1379,047 -1635,655 4308,736 1924.833
38 550,947 -810,619 788,701 -1418,248 -1690,059 4431,372 1852.094
39 551,345 -834,034 774,573 -1427,287 -1719,593 4563,275 1908.279
40 517,082 -904,602 723,369 -1488,542 -1796,068 4668,961 1720.200
Total 22002,271 -4723,526 30050,023 -20962,870 -24395,662 88123,753 90093.990
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Table 3: Total values per country
Country Wi Ni i ~Wi
USA 17131,631 52801,575 4870,641 22002,271
JAP 8168,569 26075,778 -12892,096 -4723,526
EU 19716,072 60849,327 10333,951 30050,023
CHI 2628,625 9836,434 -23591,495 -20962,870
FSU 1942,436 6403,642 -26338,098 -24395,662
ROW 40506,656 118923,057 47617,097 88123,753
Total 90093,989 274889,813 0,000 90093,989
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6 Conclusions and Extensions
In this research we operate under the assumption that countries cooperate because it makes
cooperation benecial for all countries, Flam (2006) arguments can enforce this point.
We develop transfer schemes for individual rationality for the design of international
agreements that achieve global optimality in stock pollutant stochastic control problems.
Agreements can in principle be negotiated at each period of time. These schemes are also
suitable in the context of coalitional rationality. We are going to extend to n coalitions.
The technical complexity of the stochastic algorithm arises because we are not solving
Linear Quadratic problems.
Summarizing our results, for each country i 2 J and each period t 2 T we obtain the
following solutions stocks pollution, emissions and values functions for each model, fstg,
feitg, fWi(t; st 1)g corresponding to the solution of the Cooperative Model (P1), fsNt g,
feNit g, fNi(t; sNt 1)g corresponding to the solution of the Non-Cooperative Model (P2), both
in Casas and Romera (2011), and fsVt g, feVitg, fVi(t; sVt 1)g corresponding to the solution of
the Model with Monetary transfers (P3).
We nd of interest to consider a stochastic model with probability performance criteria
and obtain the existence of an optimal policy. In absence of international cooperation, these
optimal policies obtained under this new perspective could be an alternative behavior for
each country which nally will help reducing the international stock pollutant. Note that
the target value (X) could be chosen by each country, according some particular negotiation.
Usually the target value (X) should be a quantity ranging between the non-cooperative value
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function and the cooperative value function. These schemes are also suitable in the context
of coalitional rationality.
We nd of interest to consider stochastic performance criteria based on bounds of proba-
bility, i.e., Markov Decision Problem with percentile performance criteria where the decision-
maker wants to nd a policy that achieves a specic value (target) at a specied probability
level .
Further research could be done if we consider uncertainty about the random perturbation,
say the variance of the i.i.d. sequence. We propose to estimate the parameter recursively and
to include the estimation in the stochastic control problem. Stochastic performance criteria
based on bounds of probability could be considered.
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